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NOTE AND COMMENT
STATE IMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY
It is believed that the adage that "The King Can Do No
Wrong" expounded in Blackstone's Commentaries' has not
only been productive of much wrong in American juris-
prudence, but that it has also been the source of considerable
confusion in our courts.
The phrase is supposed to be the foundation upon which
our doctrine of state immunity from suit in tort rests. This
dogmatic statement, a leftover from the feudal system of 12th
Century England, is hardly believed to be a proper basis on
which to excuse a state' from its obligations. Should not a
state be bound by the legal principles which it enunciates
through its courts for the dealings of citizens, one with an-
other? By what excuse can a state say, "If anyone else does
it, it is a wrong; if I do it, it is not a wrong?"
The first ten amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion were passed to prevent arbitrary action by the state
against individual rights. Certainly the state should be an-
swerable for its torts in order to prevent arbitrary action.
This comment will attempt to survey the doctrine with a view
to finding a remedy for the injustices which this doctrine now
protects.
State irresponsibility in tort in the United States has been
justified on two grounds: (1) The common law doctrine
adopted from England based upon the principle that the King
could do no wrong, and (2) the theory best enumerated and
clarified by Justice Holmes while a member of the Supreme
Court' who said that a state is exempt from suit on the ground
that there can be no legal right against the authority that
makes the law on which that right depends.
The phrase "the king can do no wrong" rests upon a mis-
conception of the original dictum. The maxim was originally
understood not to mean that the king could not do wrong in
the sense that he was incapable of doing a wrong, but that he
was not privileged to do wrong.' The king was obligated to
right any wrongs which he had done. The only unique thing
about his wrongs was that the remedies, if redress were re-
fused, were necessarily weak. The king was obliged to rectify
a wrong; if he refused however, he could be punished by his
'I1 Commentaries 239.
'State as used in this article means any organized group of society ex-
ercising governmental function.
'Kawananakoa v. Polyblank (1905) 205 U. S. 349, 27 Sup. Ct. 526.
4Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1924-25).
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religious superiors. If there ever was any factual basis for the
doctrine, it was completely overthrown in the political field in
1215 with the signing of the Magna Carta. Therefore it ap-
pears that the early concept that the king was not privileged in
his wrongs has been misinterpreted to lay down the very op-
posite proposition that the king is privileged in his wrongs. A
prerogative which was created to protect and benefit the subject
has been misconstrued to the subjects prejudice.
Early America had no difficulty with the problem. Fresh
from a fight against state despotism and with the rights of man
still foremost in their minds, the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1793 had no trouble whatsoever in saying that a state
was not immune from suit.' Justice Blair very ably put the
thinking of the time in the following excerpt from his opinion
in Chisholm v. Georgia:
"The principle is, that all human law must be prescribed
by a superior: this principle I mean not now to examine:
sufficient, at present, to say, that another principle, very
different in its nature and operations, forms in my judg-
ment, the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws
derived from the pure source of equality and justice must
be founded on the consent of those whose obedience they
require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must
be found in man. . . .A state I cheerfully admit is the
noblest work of man: but man himself, free and honest is,
I speak as to this world, the noblest work of God.'
Such thinking was short lived. In 1794, as a result of the
Chisholm decision, the eleventh amendment to the Constitution
was submitted by-Congress, adopted in 1798, and has ever since
been interpreted to give the state absolute immunity from suit."
The amendment was not motivated to maintain the state so-
vereignty from the degradation supposed to attend a com-
pulsory appearance before a tribunal, but rather to protect
the states from being forced to pay their legally contracted
debts by a suit in federal court. That this was the motive was
stated by none other than Chief Justice Marshall.'
Since 1794 there has been little, if any, progress on the
part of the courts toward getting back on the right track. The
courts have guarded the doctrine very zealously under some
6Chisholm v. State of Georgia (1793) 2 Dallas 419.
"d.
'Hans v. Louisiana (1889) 134 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 504; Smith v. Reeves
(1900) 178 U. S. 436, 20 Sup. Ct. 919.
"Cohen v. Virginia (1821) 6 Wheat 264.
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false feeling that to change it would go to the very roots of
our governmental foundation.
Oddly enough, however, is the fact that countries of con-
tinental Europe, where the divine right of kings held greatest
sway, have long since repudiated the concept and freely allow
redress against the tortious conduct of the state through its
legal agents when acting within the scope of their legal duties.'
Even in England, an individual injured tortiously by the
state has a remedy in a petition of right."° Although not alto-
gether satisfactory, it at least rests the obligation of determin-
ing wrongs in the courts rather than in the legislature. There-
fore one might well be astonished to find such a despotic doc-
trine so deeply embedded in the jurisprudence of the United
States where freedom and justice were first championed. Until
recently, the only progress made by the federal government
was in 1855 when the Court of Claims was established, but
the legislation excepted tort claims from its jurisdiction. In
1922 the Court of Claims was allowed to hear certain tort
claims up to $1,000, but this relief was administrative only."
A few states have, by legislative enactment, attempted
some remedies for the defects, but the claimant, when attempt-
ing to pursue these remedies, has met with such literal con-
struction on the part of courts that his action has turned out
to be largely a waste of time.'
A few of the injustices done by the doctrine include the
following cases: A Massachusetts health officer believed that
a horse had glanders; he thereupon ordered it shot. Upon the
verdict of a lay jury that he was mistaken, he found himself
subjected to heavy damages without support or sympathy
from the government or community that employed him."
In State v. Rathbarne," a Montana farmer stood by and
watched state owned elk and deer devour his much needed
hay from 1931 to 1939 with no recourse whatsoever from the
state for damages amounting to some $20,000 over the nine
year period. And then to add salt to his wounds, after long
effort to have the State Fish and Game Commission remedy
*Borchard, Governmenttal Responeibility in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1 (1926-
27).
"id., p. 34.
uBorchard, Governmental ResponsibiUty in Tort-A Proposed Statutory
Reform, 11 A. B. A. JOURNAL 495 (1925).
"Smith v. New York (1920) 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841: Bourn v. Hart
(1892) 93 Cal. 321, 28 P. 951.
"Miller v. Horton (1891) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100.
"(1940) 110 Mont. 225, 100 P. (2d) 86.
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the situation without avail, he found himself subjected to a
criminal prosecution by the Commission, when in defense of his
property he shot one of the animals out of season.
In Oklahoma, a woman was injured in an auto accident
caused by the negligence of certain officers of the State High-
way Commission. The Legislature of Oklahoma authorized her
to maintain an action against the state to determine liability
and recover loss for the negligence of the officer. But the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied the right, saying that this
was a special law and such laws are unconstitutional and in-
valid where a general law could be made applicable.' The
court reasoned that to do justice for this woman would not be
fair to the many other people injured by the agents of the state
who cannot recover because of the doctrine of state irresponsi-
bility.
Likewise in California a legislative appropriation made
to an employee of the state in payment of a claim for damages
on account of personal injuries sustained by him in its service
was held to be a gift within the meaning of a constitutional
provision" prohibiting the legislature from making a gift of
any public money."
In New York, a court of claims was given jurisdiction "to
hear and determine a private claim against the state" arising
out of certain torts of its officers, the measure providing that
"the state hereby consents, in all such claims, to have its lia-
bility determined." The court admitted that the state had
waived its immunity against action, but it had not waived its
substantive immunity for the torts of its officers. It said, "Im-
munity from action is one thing, immunity from the torts of
its officers and agents is another. "' Such a construction leaves
the act as a nullity for no judgment could be obtained since
the state can act only through its officers. It has been aptly
said that one might conclude "that the act was calculated to
1Jack v. State (1937) 183 Okla. 375, 82 P. (2d) 1033.
1Montana Constitution has such a provision. Art. XIII Sec. I reads:
"Neither the state nor any county, city, town, municipality, nor
other subdivision of the state shall ever give or loan its credit in
aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise,
to any individual, association or corporation or become a sub-
scriber to, or ashareholder in any company or corporation, or ajoint owner with any person, company or corporation, except to
such ownership as may accrue to the state by operation or pro-
vision of law."TSupra, note 12
"HuprG, note 12. New York statute has since been amended to make
state "liable" for torts of its agents.
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permit the claimant merely to amuse himself" by bringing an
action.
In Idaho, the legislature voted to allow a claim for $3,000
against the state for injuries sustained by an individual due to
negligence of a state employee but the Idaho court rejected
the claim saying any such act is retroactive legislation in viola-
tion of the state constitution."
However, the Montana Supreme Court in Mills v. Stewart"
held an enactment by the legislature authorizing a student
at Montana State University to present his claim to the Board
of Examiners for determination of damages to be paid to him
up to $7,500 to be constitutional. The student fell down an
elevator shaft at one of the residence halls of the university
which had not been properly safeguarded. Montana has con-
stitutional prohibitions similar to those which were held to pre-
vent the relief in both the Idaho and the California Cases.
In an attempt to find the proper solution for the problem,
courts have entangled themselves in a maze of arbitrary classi-
fications as far as liability for the torts of officers of municipal
corporations, school districts, and counties are concerned. An
attempt has been made to classify the functions of public cor-
porations as being either governmental or proprietary; allow-
ing suit when acting in its proprietary function and denying
recovery when the court determines that the corporation is
acting in a governmental capacity. Much confusion results.
Montana is typical in its confusion of the subject. It has held
that the maintenance of a fire department is proprietary, but
the firemen while actually performing their duties as such are
acting in a governmental capacity, and the city is not liable
for torts committed by the firemen.'
Normally a county is protected from suit by the State im-
munity unless there is a specific statute allowing suit." It is
reasoned that the county is only a governmental subdivision of
the State. In Johnson v. City of Billings," however, the plain-
tiff was injured when her car collided with a truck being driven
by an employee of Yellowstone County. The City of Billings
and the county were working jointly building a drainage ditch
for a highway. The Montana Supreme Court laid down the
"State v. Parson (1938) 58 Idaho 787. 80 P. (2d) 20.
" (1926) 76 Mont. 429. 247 P. 332, 47 A. L. R. 424.
"State ex rel Kern v. Arnold (1935) 100 Mont. 346. 49 P. (2d) 976, 100A. L. R. 1071.
2Johnson v. City of Billings (1936) 101 Mont. 463. 54 P. (2d) 579.2id. See Kline, Mability of (Jounties for Negligent Acts and Omissiotin
of Their Employees and Officers, 3 MONT. L. RE%. 128 (1942).
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proposition that a county as well as a city may be engaged in
functions which are proprietary, and when so engaged is liable
for the torts committed by its agents. In so doing, they held the
maintenance of a highway to be a proprietary function of the
county.
In Jacoby v. Chouteau County," it was held that a county
in the operation of a ferry across the Missouri River was acting
in its proprietary capacity. The court in the two cases based the
ability to sue the county for tort upon a very broad interpreta-
tion of Section 4444 of the 1935 Revised Codes of Montana."
That at best such distinctions are extremely arbitrary is
shown by three Montana cases involving public operation of
swimming pools and gymnasiums. In Rhoades v. School Dis-
trict No. 9," the operation of a gymnasium by a school district
was held to be a governmental function. Likewise in Perkins v.
Trask' the court said that the maintenance of a swimming pool
by a school district is governmental so that no action will lie for
the death of a minor caused by the negligent operation of the
pool. In Felton v. Great Falls," however, it decided that the
operation of a swimming pool by a city was proprietary. The
court in the Felton case distinguished the Perkins and Rhoades
cases by saying that the school districts were mere agents of the
state and as such were not liable in tort for the negligence of
their agents and employees. But Section 1022 of the Revised
Codes contains a general provision that school districts may sue
and be sued, which is identical with Section 4444 as to counties.
In neither the Johnson case nor the Jacoby case did the
Court make any distinction between counties and cities, but
rather rested its decision on the fact that Section 4444 allowed
the county to be sued when acting in its proprietary capacity.
The Felton case seems to indicate by way of explanation of the
Perkins and Rhoades cases that school districts can act in no
other capacity than governmental. It is not the purpose of this
comment to attempt to resolve the apparent conflict in these
cases. They are merely inserted here to illustrate the confusion
believed to be fairly typical in our American courts because of a
superficial classification based upon the faulty concept of state
immunity.
The doctrine has caused more confusion in determining
"(1941) 112 Mont. 70, 112 P. (2d) 1068.
'R.C.M. 1935 §4444: "Enumeration of Powers: It (a county) has pow-
er 1. to sue and be sued. .. ."
w(1943) 115 Mont. 353. 142 P. (2d) 890.(1933) 96 Mont. 1, 23 P. (2d) 982.
0(1946) ........ Mont .......... 169 P. (2d) 229.
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when a suit is actually one against the state. In Heiser v.
Severy" the plaintiff brought an action for claim and delivery
against the members of the State Fish and Game Commission
alleging wrongful seizure of his gun by a deputy game warden,
who was acting under instructions from the commission, and
with the intent to confiscate the gun. The plaintiff asked for
return of the gun and damages amounting to $50 to be col-
lected from a special fund set up for the Fish and Game Com-
mission. The seizure purported to have been authorized by an
act of the legislature." But the plaintiff claimed that the suit
was against the officers acting under an unconstitutional act,
and as such, was not a suit against the state. The defendants
claimed that a suit against the officers in their official capacity
constituted a suit against the state and could not be main-
tained. The Supreme Court, unable to see how the damages
could be satisfield, held the suit to be one against the state,
but on rehearing indicated that the officers might be sued as
individuals.' The great weight of authority has recognized
that a suit for recovery of the possession of property from an
individual assertedly holding such property as an officer of
the state does not constitute an action against the sovereign,
so as to require its consent to be sued.'
On the question of when a suit against a public officer is
actually a suit against the state, we find the courts indulging
in arbitrary distinctions, which prove highly unsatisfactory to
any of the litigants. Some courts have argued along the line
previously stated by Justice Holmes that there can be no legal
right against an authority upon which the enforcement of that
right depends. The logical conclusions of this statement have
not been followed in practice because from such a statement
one would conclude that no legal right existed when the state
was the defending party to a suit. That there is such a legal
right is inherent in the fact that the state may consent to be
sued. If no legal right exists, as Mr. Holmes asserted, consent
to be sued would give rise to no liability.
If no legal right exists it becomes hard to explain how pay-
ment of liability insurance for certain public officers out of
0(1945) ...... Mont ........ 158 P. (2d) 501, 160 A. L. R. 319.
'R.C.M. 1935, §3659.
'Heiser subsequent to this decision commenced an action against the
commission in their individual capacity for recovery of the same shot-
gun and damages, the action was terminated by a judgment of dis-
missal in view of the fact that the defendants returned the shotgun
and paid the plaintiff $100 demanded in settlement.
"'Two of the Justices dissented as to replevin but concurred as to the
right to collect damages.
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general state funds could be a public purpose,' or how a city
can expend money to defend an assault suit against a member
of its police force when it was not in any way liable for the
tortious acts of the policeman and did not assume any liability
by spending public money to defend him."
Therefore, it appears that what Mr. Holmes called "logical
and practical'" is quite as fallacious as is Blackstone's ap-
proach to the subject.
The American courts have tried to compensate for the
short-comings of state irresponsibility by allowing suit against
the public officer in an individual capacity. They reason that
if personal liability attends the officer in the carrying out of
his official duty, he will be more attentive to his duties be-
cause the proper functioning of his office becomes to him a
personal responsibility. In actual practice the very opposite
is more likely to result. This undue burden tends to keep good
men from going into public service. Only the financially irre-
sponsible can afford to risk the personal liability connected
with public office, and the remedy to the injured citizens in
such a case is altogether illusory. Small pay with large risk
induces a fear to enforce the law."
Even this substitute has been categorized by the courts so
that emphasis is not placed upon ordinary tort principles, but
rather upon technical rules of official sanction and discretion.
If the official duty is public, no private redress is available,
the only remedy being public prosecution.' If the act of the
official involves discretion or is quasi-judicial, no civil liability
attaches as long as the official acts within the scope of his
authority, regardless of the presence of negligence or error.'
Only when the official acts are purely ministerial is the official
liable to individuals for misfeasance or nonfeasance in the ex-
ercise of his office.'
Claimants against the state are in the end left to the
caprice of the legislature. The legislature is not a judicial
body. The settling of tort claims is a proper judicial function.
To allow one to pursue his remedy in the legislature would ap-
'People v. Standard Ace Ins. Co. (1941) 42 C. A. (2d) 409, 108 P. (2d)
923.
"Nampa v. Kibler (1941) 62 Idaho 511. 113 P. (2d) 411.
Supra, note 3.
"Stupra, note 11.
Worden v. Witt (1895) 4 Idaho 40, 39 P. 1114: Northwest Steel Co. v.
School Dist. (1915) 76 Oregon 321, 148 P. 1134.
"Supra, note 29.
"Smith v. Zimmer (1912) 45 Mont. 282, 125 P. 420.
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pear to breach one of the fundamental concepts of our form of
government-the separation of powers. True the legislature
controls the purse strings, but that fact should give it no li-
cense to determine tort liability. The legislature is a policy
making body. It is-not a body to determine the individual's
rights arising from some particular injury. The legislature
has no guide to determine liability as has the courts but rather
it is influenced by the lobbying and vote-getting power of the
claimant. One's claim is not determined by legal principles of
negligence, proximate cause, and damages. Rather, it may be
determined by the political affiliation of the claimant, or his
political influence. Even when legislatures pass enabling leg-
islation, courts often construe it so narrowly as to lead to abor-
tive results.'
I To uphold the doctrine in a democratic government is in-
defensible. The system of government created in this country
has no counterpart of the king as does England where the
doctrine arose. There was no necessity whatsoever for trans-
planting that part of the common law into American juris-
prudence. Probably the outstanding reason for the preserva-
tion of the antiquated doctrine was to allow the several states
to hedge on their legally contracted debts."
A state which cannot stand upon the principles for which
it was created when dealing with those from whence its power
is derived is not on the strongest foundation. If principles are
just, the state should subject itself to the same principles as
it seeks to administer. The state is but an instrumentality of
the people. The Supreme Court of Montana recognized that
the state is not sovereign.' Government is not sovereignty.
Government is the machinery or expedient for expressing the
will of the sovereign power.' The sovereignty of the United
States consists of the powers existing in the people as a whole
and the persons to whom they have delegated it, and not as a
separate personal entity, and as such it does not possess the
personal privileges of the Sovereign of England."
The scope and fields of government are forever extend-
ing. In 1938, besides the ten administrative departments repre-
sented in the United States cabinet, there were 142 separate
federal bureaus and agencies embracing all types of industries
'
0Supra, note 15, 19.
4tGuthrie, The Eleventh Amendment, 8 Cor- L. REv. 183 (1908).
"State v. Dixon (1923) 66 Mont. 76. 213 P. 227.
"Bisbee v. Cochise County (1938) 52 Ariz. 1, 78 P. (2d) 982.
"Filbin Cori. v. U. S. 226 F. 911.
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and fields of endeavor.'" Since that time the number has sub-
stantially increased. The same is true of state commissions,
boards, and agencies. New ones are being created with each
new session of the legislature, and old ones only rarely are
terminated. Decisions of the courts have overwhelmingly
clothed these agencies with the state's immunity from suit.
Many of such agencies are acting in a purely corporate capac-
ity. The problem is progressively more acute.
The 79th Congress of the United States realizing the in-
justices of the present system and desiring to clear the con-
gressional halls of private claim seekers who only serve to
hamper speedy legislative processes, passed as a part of its
Reorganization Act, the Federal Tart Claims Act. It is a big.
step in the right direction as far as the Federal government, is
concerned."
Under the act, claims for less than $1000 may be submitted
to the federal agency involved in the action. If payment is ac-
cepted, the government liability is discharged. If the claimant
is not satisfied, however, he may pursue his remedy in the
courts.
Claims involving more than $1000 must be prosecuted in
the Federal District Court for the area where the event took
place. Actions and procedure are regulated by the Federal Pro-
cedure Act of 1934." The local federal attorney is to be named
as defendant along with the United States. Trial will be with-
out jury, and appeal may be had to the circuit court of appeals,
and ultimately to the Court of Claims. The Attorney General
is authorized to compromise any claim after institution of suit
with the approval of the court where the suit is pending. A
statute of limitations of one year bars all claims. Certain types
of claims which already have an adequate remedy are ex-
cepted." Payment of a claim relieves the employee or officer
from liability. Attorney fees are limited to 10% on claims be-
fore agencies and 20% on claims pursued in the courts. Costs
exclusive of Attorney fees may be recovered in the judgment.
Although the act will need much interpretation by court
decision, it appears to be quite adequate in its scope.
The big obstacle to overcome, now, is the immunity claimed
"Congresonal Record-House Apr. 6, 1938 pp. 6364-65.
"U. S. Code Cong. Service (1946) p. 807.
"148 STAT. 1064.
'Section 421 of the act
10
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by the several states. The Montana Court in Coldwater v. State
Highway Cammissione recognized the problem but stated:
"There is perhaps merit in appellant's contention that
the rule of immunity of the sovereign from liability to the
individual is outmoded, harsh, and unjust. Nevertheless
it is firmly established under the common law and beyond
the power of this court to repudiate. Should the people
see fit they have the power, through the legislature, to
consent that the state may be sued, and to determine under
what circumstances the state and its agencies shall become
answerable to the individual. If reform in this respect is
desirable, it is a matter for the legislature, not for the
courts."
In Johnson v. Billings' however, the court very aptly said:
"Precedent not supported by logic or reason, or where the
reason for the rule has ceased to exist, should be dis-
carded as being both unjust and dangerous; a menace
to good government. The tendency blindly to follow ease
law, regardless of existing reason places courts in the
category of men who continue to follow the calf track so
graphically described in Sam Waller Foss' poem.'
The theory of state immunity was developed by court de-
cision. It is therefore submitted that it might be overthrown
by court decision, thus freeing us from this oppressive doc-
trine to which we are now shackled by stare decisis.
Probably a sounder approach, however, would be that sug-
gested in the Coldwater case, namely reform through legislative
action. It is submitted that a statute patterned after the fed-
eral act with due consideration for municipal, county and state
liability, and with appropriate exceptions should hold a high
place on the current legislative calendar for the State of
Montana and the several states.
JOE McELWAIN.
4(1945) .... Mont. 162 P. (2d) 772.
"Supra, note 22.
5'Poem cited in dissenting opinion of Justice Scott in Van Kleeck v.
Ramer (1916) 62 Colo. 4, 156 P. 1108, who said:
"I may be permitted to suggest for the consideration of the court
and judges who feel impelled to sacrifice their sense of reason
and justice upon the Alter of the Golden Calf of precedent, the
quaint philosophy of Sam Walter Foss, in the following lines:
One day through the primeval wood
A calf walked home, as good calves should;
But left a trail all bent askew,
A crooked trail, as all calves do.
11
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Since then, three hundred years have fled,
And, I infer, the calf is dead.
But still he left behind this trail,
And thereby hangs my moral tale.
The trail was taken up next day
By a lone dog that passed that way;
And then a wise bell-wether sheep
Pursued the trail o'er hill and glade,
Through those old woods a path was made,
And many men wound In and out,
And bent and turned and dodged about,
And uttered words of righteous wrath,
Because 'twas such a crooked path;
But still they followed--do not laugh-
The first migrations of that calf,
And through this winding woodway stalked
Because he wabbled when he walked.
This forest path became a lane,
That bent and turned and turned again;
This crooked lane became a road,
Where many a poor horse, with his load,
Toiled on, beneath the burning sun,
And traveled some three miles in one.
And thus a century and a half
They trod the footsteps of that calf.
The years passed on with swiftness fleet,
The road became a village street,
And this, before men were aware,
A city's crowded thoroughfare.
And soon the central street was this
Of a renowned metropoili.
And men two centuries and a half
Trod the footsteps of that calf.
Each day a hundred thousand route
Followed the zigzag calf about;
And o'er his crooked journey went
The traffic of a continent.
A hundred thousand men were led
By one calf near three centuries dead.
They followed still his crooked way,
And lost one hundred years a day;
For thus such reverence is lent
To well-established precedent.
A moral lesson this might teach,
Were I ordained and called to preach.
For men are prone to go It blind
Along the calf-paths of the mind,
And toil away from sun to sun
To do what other men have done.
They follow in the beaten track,
And out and in, and forth and back,
12
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And still their devious course pursue
To keep the path that others do.
But how the wise old wood-gods laugh,
Who saw the first primeval calf!
Ah! many things this tale might teach;
But I am not ordained to preach.
THE APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS ACT IN MONTANA
In 1922 the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was
drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Al-
though several states had adopted a declaratory act of this na-
ture prior to this time, the majority have since adopted the Uni-
form Act as drafted by the Commissioners. Up to March 1943,
the Federal Government' and all but eight states' had adopted
declaratory judgments acts with more than three thousand cases
having been adjudicated under the provisions of such acts. Ac-
cording to an eminent authority' on the subject, more declara-
tory judgments were rendered in the seven year period from
1934 to 1941 than in the time prior to 1934, indicating the in-
creasing awareness by bench and bar of its value as a judicial
remedy.
Montana in 1935 became the twenty-first state to adopt the
Uniform Act' but since its enactment the Montana Supreme
Court has only considered eleven cases' which asked for or in-
volved declaratory judgments. Whether these eleven cases rep-
resent the total need for declaratory judgments can, of course,
only be a matter of conjecture, but when compared with the ex-
tensive use made of it in other jurisdictions it would seem that
members of the bar have not taken full advantage of the Act.
'See Uniform Laws Annotated No. 9 (1940) Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part p. 70.
'48 STAT. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C. §400 (1940).
'Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Oklahoma.
'BoncHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMErNTS (2nd ed. 1941) p. vii.
aR.C.M. 1935 §9835.1-9835.16.
'Toole County Irrigation Dist. v. State (1937) 104 Mont. 420, 67 P. (2d)
989; Tongue River and Yellowstone River Irrigation Dist. v. Hyslop et
al. (1939) 109 Mont. 190, 96 P. (2d) 273; Mulholland v. Ayers et al
(1940) 109 Mont. 558, 99 P. (2d) 234; Blackford v. Judith Basin Coun-
ty (1940) 109 Mont. 578, 98 P. (2d) 872; State ex rel. Butte Brewing
Co. v. District Court (1940) 110 Mont. 250, 100 P. (2d) 932; Vantura
v. Mont. Liquor Control Board (1942) 113 Mont. 265, 124 P. (2d) 569;
Gullickson v. Mitchell (1942) 113 Mont. 359, 126 P. (2d) 1106; Pollard
v. Mont. Liquor Control Board (1942) 114 Mont. 220, 131 P. (2d)
974; Bottomly, Atty. Gen. v. Meagher County (194) 114 Mont. 220,
133 P. (2d) 770; State ex rel. Davidson v. Ford, Gov. (1943) 115 Mont.
165, 141 P. (2d) 373; Carey, State Treas. v. McFatridge et al. (1943)
115 Mont. 278, 142 P. (2d) 229.
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